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Abstract 
 
Due to information asymmetry problem in financial markets good quality firms often find it 
difficult to prove to external finance providers about their true quality and to distinguish 
themselves from bad quality firms. We argue that instead of sending indirect signals to 
financial market good quality firms could focus on improving their productivity to obtain 
external finance. Besides relying solely on firms’ balance sheet information external finance 
providers using firms’ TFP or labour productivity information would have a true knowledge 
of firms’ efficiency and risk. Overall, using a panel of 1591 Chinese listed manufacturing 
firms between 2003-2016 we find that productivity measured by TFP or labour productivity 
is statistically and economically important and positive in determining firms’ external finance, 
i.e. total leverage, new issue of equity and long-term debt. We find that productivity is 
helpful for firms to raise new equity finance, but only some weak results for total leverage 
and long-term debt. Such results hold for both the whole sample and private firm sample. We 
also find that large and/or old firms and exporting firms are able to make better use of their 
productivity to gain external finance than their respective counterparts, i.e. small young firms 
and non-exporting firms. The causality of the regression results is also confirmed by 
difference-in-difference tests using an exogenous industrial policy shock.  
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1. Introduction  
 
It is well recognised that financial market imperfections result in good quality firms being 
unable to raise external funds for their profitable projects. There has been extensive research 
that focus on firms’ financing behaviour under the assumption that firms are adversely 
affected by financial market imperfections. Studies have also been investigating how legal 
and institutional advancement may improve the market imperfection situation and 
consequently improve the accessibility of external finance for all firms in the market (e.g. 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; Ӧztekin and Flannery, 
2012). Anecdotal evidence seems to show that financial institutions tend to base their lending 
decisions on bank relations or firms’ balance sheet information, which is subject to window 
dressing. Tan et al. (2014) does find evidence that non-state Chinese listed firms manipulate 
their earnings to meet the performance targets required by the stock market in order to raise 
equity finance. Johan and Wu (2014) also find that the quality of the lender-borrower 
relationship makes no contribution to small firms’ access to debt in China or Canada. 
Therefore, external financial resources do not necessarily go to the truly efficient firms. 
However, little is known about how heterogeneous firms can distinguish themselves from 
others and prove to external finance providers about their true worthiness
3
, and therefore 
suffer less from the information asymmetry problem under given institutional environment. 
In other words, little is known about whether truly good firms do get external finance. We try 
to fill in this gap in this paper. 
In recent years, the relationship between firms’ productivity and their finance has 
attracted increasing attention among scholars for most major economies, e.g. Chen and 
Guariglia (2013) for China, Krishnan et al. (2015) for the US, Ferrando and Ruggieri (2018) 
for Euro area countries. Most recently, Egger and Keuschnigg (2017)’s model shows that 
banks are only willing to lend to firms with a minimum productivity level, which will enable 
firms to thrive in the market and allow banks to break even from the lending. Neuhann and 
Saidi (2018) find from US public firms that with better informational economy of scale, i.e. 
more information about firms became available to banks, following the deregulation of 
universal banks (which conduct both commercial and investment bank businesses), universal 
banks finance riskier but more productive firms. However, none of these papers has tested 
                                                 
3
 Our argument is related but very different from the signalling theory (Ross, 1977), which suggests issuing debt 
is firms’ signal of high quality to the markets. We discuss this in more details below.  
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directly whether high productivity itself would help firms to be more attractive to banks to 
get loans.  
This paper aims to further contribute to the empirical research on firms’ financing 
behaviour. In our study we explore how firms’ productivity, which is measured by either total 
factor productivity (TFP) or labour productivity, can be used as a relevant indicator of firms’ 
true value and helps firms to raise external finance. In doing so, we use Chinese listed 
manufacturing firms’ data. 
To our best knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to test whether productivity 
helps firms to raise external finance, and whether better firms do get relatively more external 
finance. Consequently, we may be able to identify productivity as a good indicator of firms’ 
quality from the perspective of external finance providers. A reliable indicator of firms’ 
quality may help to overcome information asymmetry problem in the financial markets to 
some extent and channel external finance into efficient firms. Our research effectually also 
contributes to the firm capital structure literature, which often debates about what drives 
firms’ financing choices. We offer an alternative view. Rather than being a choice of firms 
due to cost minimisation as suggested by the pecking order theories, static trade off theories 
and market timing theories, our research implies that firms’ capital structure is also 
determined by their ability of raising finance from outsiders, which may also vary across 
different forms of external finance. In other words, our results would show that firms’ capital 
structure is not only determined by what firms want, but also what they are able to have. The 
application on the Chinese listed manufacturing firm data provides a suitable testing 
environment for this research. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 reviews the relevant literature 
and describes our theoretical idea. Section 3 presents the equations for empirical tests and 
discusses our method. Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 discusses the regression results. 
Section 6 further verifies the causality of our results, and finally section 7 concludes.  
 
2. A brief literature overview 
 
There has been an increasing interest in the relationship between productivity and finance 
both at aggregate and firm level (see Heil, 2018, for a survey). While most studies focus on 
macro factors, Gatti and Love (2008), Moreno-Badia and Slootmaekers (2009), Chen and 
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Guariglia (2013), Krishnan et al. (2015), Ferrando and Ruggieri (2018) among others find 
evidence of direct link between firms’ finance and productivity, as finance may enable firms 
to optimise operations and carry out productivity enhancing investments. There is also 
limited research on the reverse link. As mentioned above, Egger and Keuschnigg (2017) and 
Neuhann and Saidi (2018) find that banks are willing to lend to productive firms even if they 
are riskier. Besides, Gonzalez and James (2007) using a panel of US listed firms shows that 
technology firms have easier access to bank lending, and current earnings and cash flows are 
significantly less important in determining such finance for technology firms than for non-
technology firms. It is not unreasonable to interpret their results as that technology, a likely 
proxy for productivity, has a positive effect on firms’ access to bank lending. However, none 
of these researches has provided any direct evidence whether productivity helps firms to raise 
external finance, which we do in this paper.  
 In the finance and growth literature a large number of studies, at both aggregate (e.g. 
Beck, et al. 2000; Carlin and Mayer, 2003) and firm levels (e.g. Brown, et al. 2009; Guariglia 
et al., 2011), find that a sound financial system or good accessibility of financial resources 
enable growth (e.g. King and Levine, 1993; Ayyagari, et al., 2011). On the other hand, in the 
long-term, economic growth is largely a reflection of rising productivity, as it drives growth 
through its direct effects such as improved effort and efficiency. Krugman (1990, 1994, 1997) 
reached his famous conclusion that “productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is 
almost everything”, when examining the relationship between productivity improvement and 
economic growth. In this paper, what we try to test potentially may bridge the two areas of 
literature together. Our finding may show an indirect channel that productivity drives growth 
through enabling external finance.  
The signalling theory developed by Ross (1977) suggests that managers have 
incentives to signal the market of firms’ high quality by choosing high leverage, as issuing 
debt can expose firms to costly financial distress (Ovtchinikov, 2010). Though Ross’s model 
also suggests that firms’ high quality would be associated with high leverage, Ross models 
leverage as a choice of firms, whereas we consider that firms are eager to demonstrate their 
qualities in order to compete for external finance. In his theory, the incentive for signalling is 
primarily managers’ personal gains, whereas we consider that the incentive for firms to prove 
their true quality is to obtain external finance. Yet in the signalling theory, quality is not 
defined in terms of observable variables (Smith and Watts, 1992), whereas we specify quality 
as firms’ productivity. 
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Our study also partially overlaps the research on a role for productivity in the firm 
capital structure literature. To formally test the effects of productivity on firms’ external 
finance, our empirical model is largely derived from the established capital structure 
literature. The main ones predicting the observed behaviour of utilising external finance by a 
value-maximising firm include the Myers and Majluf (1984)’s pecking order theory, the 
static trade-off theory and the market timing theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Also due to 
managerial optimism (Heaton, 2002) whether firms accept positive net present value projects 
may depend on whether the projects require external finance. Such financing decisions are 
only related to firms’ free cash flow and not influenced by asymmetric information and 
rational agency costs (Heaton, 2002). According to the agency theory, firms’ capital structure 
is likely an optimal response of partially entrenched and risk-neutral managers who balance 
between overinvestment and the risk of takeovers (Zwiebel, 1996). Morellec’s (2004) real 
option model also shows capital structure as risk-neutral managers’ choice between 
investment and retaining control. Mande et al. (2011) argue that good corporate governance 
reduces firms’ agency costs and consequently increases firms’ likelihood of issuing equity 
finance. Crespí and Martín-Oliver (2015) also argue the reason that family firms have easier 
access to debt than non-family firms is due to their lower agency cost. 
Nevertheless empirical evidence of those studies is inconclusive (e.g. Fama and 
French, 2002; Sarkar and Zapatero, 2003; Frank and Goyal, 2003). It is possibly attributable 
to statistical testing difficulties and the practical interpretation of those hypotheses (e.g. Leary 
and Roberts, 2010) and seem to depend on the particular stochastic process assumed for firms’ 
earnings, i.e. internal source of finance (Sarkar and Zapatero, 2003). The magnitude and 
persistency of the impact of market timing on capital structure are also challenged by some 
empirical findings, such as Alti (2006), and Hovakimian (2006). There is also evidence that 
firms often actually issue debt and equity simultaneously to reduce variation in their capital 
structure (e.g. Billinsley et al., 1994).  
However, so far the capital structure literature includes no explicit role for firms’ 
productivity. We argue that firms’ productivity demonstrates firms’ true value and therefore 
helps firms to raise external finance through the channel of mitigating information asymmetry. 
Our results would be more consistent with the pecking order theory, i.e. we confirm that more 
productive firms are able to utilise finance of higher pecking order or more expensive 
external finance.  
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A stream of research finds that legal and institutional improvement in a country can 
benefit the country’s financial development and accessibility for borrowers overall (e.g. Beck 
et al., 2003). Vanacker et al. (2014) find better shareholder protection and bankruptcy laws 
help new technology-based firms in six European countries to gain better probability to 
access and have more amount of equity and debt finance. Further, Feng et al. (2019) find 
evidence of double-edged results of government intervention in China, which promotes firms’ 
access to loans but also forces firms to make bribe payments to gain this financial access. 
Nevertheless, these authors’ focus is on macro environment rather than individual firms. 
Financial institutions may be tempted to use firm’s balance sheet information, such as 
profitability, financial health, previous loan payment history, as market signal of credit 
worthiness and to determine the eligibility of a firm for access to loans, since these 
information can be easily monitored (see Brealey et al., 1977; Fama, 1984). However, 
balance sheet information, on the other hand, is easily manipulated and often cannot convince 
outsiders about the true value of a firm (Tan et al., 2014). Institutions and firms relying on 
accounting information are deemed to suffer from information asymmetry problem. We argue 
that productivity, especially TFP, is a good indicator of firms’ true worthiness and cannot be 
easily manipulated. It helps firms to suffer less from information asymmetry problem in the 
financial markets. Therefore, we want to find out whether productive firms do get more 
external finance and in what forms of finance. To our knowledge, the existing research in the 
areas of firms’ capital structure mainly focuses on testing firms’ financing behaviour given 
the disadvantages of information asymmetries and agency problems etc., but surprisingly 
little is known on whether and how firms can relieve such disadvantage themselves so that 
they can optimise their financing and production strategy. 
 Finally, the seminal work of “Growing like China” by Song et al. (2011) shows that 
Chinese firms have experienced an enormous productivity growth and the country has 
transformed from a virtually closed economy to a world manufacturing centre in just three 
decades, and yet its financial sector is largely underdeveloped and frictional. These authors’ 
theoretical model suggests that Chinese manufacturing firms are especially interesting for 
studying the relationships between productivity and finance under China’s economic and 
financial system. The Chinese stock market opened in 1990, and only became more regulated 
from 1999, when the China Securities Acts was put into effect. Firms in China are known to 
face difficulty in raising finance (e.g. Allen et al., 2005; Poncet et al., 2010; Guariglia et al., 
2011). Hence, the Chinese context would precisely suit our research and we test whether 
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higher productivity brings more external finance to listed Chinese firms, which are likely to 
have relatively better quality than other non-listed firms and already have the access to equity 
finance. The implications found from listed firms can be easily extended to other firms, as the 
latter would typically suffer more from information asymmetries. 
 
3. The model and estimation methods 
 
In order to test the effects of productivity on firms’ external finance, we first propose the 
theoretical idea of a framework describing how firms’ productivity may link to their external 
finance in a sensible way. Then we establish empirical regression models which are implied 
by the framework and consistent with exiting theories.  
 
3.1.The proposed methodological framework  
 
Adopting an assumption that productivity fundamentally defines heterogeneity across firms 
(e.g. Melitz, 2003), our key novel idea is that in a competitive market where firms maximise 
profits and external finance providers are risk neutral or averse, firms which do not reach a 
critical level of productivity have to exit the market. Firms with an intermediate level of 
productivity are able to survive in the market, but can only rely on their own internal finance, 
because they are rationed by external finance providers who disbelieve their ability in 
generating sufficient cash flow and find them too risky to lend to or invest in. Firms with a 
high level of productivity not only grow in the market, but also have access to external 
financial markets, where finance providers find them trustworthy. This idea is illustrated in 
figure 1, where p
*
 and p
e
 are the critical productivity levels when firms can survive and start 
to access external finance respectively. This is consistent with Egger and Keuschnigg 
(2017)’s model, which shows banks can only break even if they lend to firms with a 
minimum productivity. This framework mainly builds upon the literature of capital market 
imperfections, and we assume the effect of productivity is through the channel of relieving 
information asymmetry between firms and external financial providers, which is consistent 
with Neuhann and Saidi (2018)’s findings. Neuhann and Saidi (2018) find that when more 
information becomes available, banks are willing to lend to productive firms even if they are 
riskier. 
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This framework shows that exposure to imperfect financial markets induces only the 
most productive firms to access external finance while simultaneously forcing the least 
productive firms to exit. Both the exit of the least productive firms and the additional 
investment that the most productive firms are able to undertake using the external finance, 
reallocate market shares towards the more productive firms, and eventually promote an 
aggregate productivity increase. Our framework has the empirical implication that firms’ 
productivity should have a positive effect on their ability in raising external funds through 
mitigating information asymmetry problem. Accordingly, if firms have demand of external 
finance for their investment opportunities, we should observe that higher productivity helps 
firms to keep higher leverage, keep higher debt ratio, and issue more new equity (or some 
combination of them).
4
 
Our idea above may lead to the regression model between external finance and 
productivity below. Except firms’ productivity, the variables in our equations have been well 
documented in the capital structure literature in determining firms’ external finance.  
 
extfinanceit = a + b1extfinancei,t-1 + b2salesit-1 + b3assetgrowthit-1 + b4tangibilityit-1  
+ b5roait-1 + b6depit-1 + b7productivityit-1 + vj + vt + vp + vo + eit  (1) 
 
The extfinance variables, including firm i’s total leverage, i.e. the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets, new issue of equity to total assets ratio
5
, and long-term debt to total assets ratio at 
time t, are used in separate regressions. We use the same model to compare the effects of 
productivity on three forms of external finance. sales is the logarithm of firm’s real sales; 
assetgrowth is the growth of firm’s net fixed assets in logarithm form from time t-1 to time t; 
tangibility is firm’s ratio of total tangible assets to total assets; roa is firm’s return on assets, 
which is the ratio of net profit to total assets; dep is firm’s depreciation to total assets ratio; 
productivity includes three measures of firm’s TFP and firm’s labour productivity, which is 
firm’s real sales per employee
6
, in separate regressions. vj, vt, vp and vo are two-digit industry 
dummies, year dummies, province dummies, which indicate firms’ location, and firms’ 
ownership dummies respectively. eit is an idiosyncratic error term.  
                                                 
4
 This is related but different from Ding et al. (2018)’s interpretation. Ding et al. (2018) use TFP as a supply 
side measure of firms’ investment opportunities, and found TFP has positive effects on firms’ investment. In 
their case, firms may or may not need/use external finance for their investment. Whereas in our case we 
explicitly test the situation when firms has the demand of external finance.  
5
 We define the new equity issues ratio following Baker et al. (2003).  
6
 More detailed variable definitions can be found in the appendix A.2.  
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The estimation of TFP is practically difficult as econometricians cannot observe firms’ 
production decisions and therefore face problems such as endogenous input choices by firms, 
and different technology employed by a firm with multiple products. Therefore, we apply 
three popular methods of TFP estimation
7
 in order to verify the robustness of our results. First, 
we use the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP thereafter) method using the revenue function. It 
uses firms’ intermediate inputs to control for unobserved productivity shock in order to 
address the problem of endogenous input choices, as well as the problem of non-negative and 
lumpy investment, which was used as the proxy by Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP thereafter). 
Second, we use the Wooldridge (2009)’s GMM method, which further improves the 
simultaneity issues in the estimation by LP or OP. Then we use the more recent Ackerberg et 
al. (2015) (ACF hereafter) method, which further addresses the functional dependence 
problem suffered by LP and OP methods by inverting the investment or intermediate demand 
functions unconditional on the labour input. They also argue that comparing to Wooldridge 
(2009) their method has the advantage of allowing a more general data-generating process.  
Though TFP is believed to be a good measure of manufacturing firms’ productivity 
(see Syverson 2011 for a survey), it is not easily observable or comparable by external 
finance providers. Therefore, we also test eq. (1) using labour productivity, which provides a 
further check of the robustness of our findings.   
Direct bankruptcy costs (Warner, 1977) and borrowing costs associated with 
information asymmetries in the financial markets (Ferri and Jones, 1979; Titman and Wessels, 
1988) mean that it is easier for large firms to borrow, i.e. to keep high leverage. However, on 
the other hand, firms with large sales have more retained earnings, which is a cheap internal 
source of finance, and thus have less need of external finance. We use firms’ real sales to 
proxy firm size and expect it to have either positive or negative coefficient.  
The inclusion of firms’ net fixed asset growth is to capture firms’ growth 
opportunities. The relationship between firms’ growth opportunities and leverage may vary. 
High growth opportunities may lead to worse shareholder-bondholder conflict (Myers, 1977), 
and assets substitution and dilution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, firms reduce 
leverage as a response to control the costs associated with these problems. Titman and 
Wessels (1988) argue that expected future growth should be negatively related to long-term 
debt level due to agency cost. However, the agency problem is mitigated if firms issue short-
term debt (Myers, 1977). Under the pecking order theory, if firms’ priority is current period 
                                                 
7
 When estimating firms’ TFP, we assume endogenous technological progress following Romer (1990), and 
Aghion and Howitt (1998).  
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investment, firms’ leverage will increase with higher growth opportunities, as firms would 
finance the current investment projects with increased debt (Ovtchinnikov, 2010). However, 
if firms are more concerned with future investment, they would prefer to keep current 
leverage low and reserve their debt capacity in anticipation of future finance for investment 
(Ovtchinnikov, 2010). Using a dynamic model of investment and financing, Sundaresan et al. 
(2015) also show that a rational firm significantly lowers its leverage in anticipation of future 
growth. Thus, the sign of the asset growth variable in our model may be uncertain.  
Tangible assets can be used as collateral by lenders and thus firms’ opportunity to 
engage in asset substitution is reduced (Stulz and Johnson, 1985), which eases the agency 
problem. This suggests a likely positive effect of assets tangibility on leverage. However, 
when firms’ leverage is not too high, managers may tend to consume more than the optimal 
level of perquisites, which suggests a negative relation between collateralisable (tangible) 
capital and leverage (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Hence, the sign of tangibility variable may 
be also uncertain. We also expect the effect of tangibility on firms’ equity finance would be 
uncertain too. Investors can claim firm’s remaining assets after lenders in case of bankruptcy. 
On the other hand, investors may prefer firms to have low tangibility so that more funds may 
be freed up for profitable investment, which benefits shareholders more directly than 
debtholders.  
Return on assets (ROA) is used to measure firms’ profitability. According to the 
pecking order theory, profitable firms would have less need to finance investment projects 
with more expensive external finance, and thus have lower leverage. Profitable firms may 
also use internal finance to repurchase outstanding equity when their share price is low 
according to market timing theory, and have less need of issuing new equity. On the other 
hand, under the trade-off theory more profitable firms have lower potential costs of financial 
distress, and thus can utilise more debt to shield against income tax and control the agency 
cost of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Thus, debt is more attractive and affordable for more 
profitable firms, i.e. leverage is higher. The overall effect of profitability depends on which 
incentive dominates.  
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) suggest that firms’ depreciation is a corporate tax 
shield substitute for debt. If firms utilise their depreciation deductions to shield corporate tax, 
firms may not try to use debt for the same purpose given concerns of financial distress risk. 
This follows the logic of the trade-off theory. Therefore, we may expect a negative 
relationship between depreciation and leverage. Huang and Song (2006) find a negative 
relation between such tax shield and the leverage of Chinese listed firms. However, the effect 
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of depreciation on firms’ new equity might be opposite. High depreciation leads to high cost 
in firms’ income statement, which leads to lower net income and lower retained earnings. 
According to the market timing theory, when firms are short in their internal source of 
finance, they have stronger incentives to issue new equity. Therefore, we may expect a 
positive effect of depreciation on firms’ new equity. 
Industry and time dummies are common in the literature to control for industry 
specific characteristics and time effects. There has been numerous empirical evidence of 
cross-sectional differences in firms’ capital structure related to industrial effects (e.g. Titman 
and Wessels, 1988), and positive relation between firms’ capital structure and the average of 
their industry (e.g. Bradley et al., 1984). The province dummies are to control the fixed effect 
associated with firm location. The Chinese economy has a strong location dimension, where 
typically the coastal provinces have more advanced economies than others do. Provincial 
authorities have numerous local policies that shape the economic and legal environment for 
firms.  
Ownership dummies
8
 account for various managerial incentives that may affect firms’ 
capital structure especially in the Chinese context. For example, it is often believed that state 
firms have easier access to external finance due to the fact that in the event of bankruptcy 
state firms are likely to be bailed out by public finance. Foreign firms often have access to 
finance abroad such as funds from their parent companies and foreign financial institutions, 
whereas private firms in China are discriminated in financial markets (Allen et al., 2005). An 
et al. (2014) find evidence from Chinese listed firms that ownership structure has a strong 
impact on the collateral requirement of firms for their loans.  
The Chinese stock market started with only state firms in the early 1990s, and the 
state firms dominated the market for many years. As the privatisation process goes on, both 
the proportion of state firms in the stock market and the proportion of state shares in firms 
keep reducing. In our sample, the proportion of state firms drops each year from over 60% in 
2003 to about 30% in 2016. To further eliminate the influence of financial privileges that 
firms with some ownership types may enjoy, we also test eq. (1) with domestic private firm 
sample only. If our results are also valid for the most disadvantaged group of domestic 
private firms, we may be more confident that the productivity effects are not driven by some 
firms’ ownership privilege in obtaining external finance.  
                                                 
8
 We include 5 ownership dummies, i.e. 1. central state owned, 2. lower level state owned, 3. domestic private, 4. 
foreign including Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau, 5. others, which are defined by firms’ ultimate controlling 
shareholders.  
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extfinanceit = a + b1extfinancei,t-1 + b2salesit-1 + b3assetgrowthit-1 + b4tangibilityit-1  
+ b5roait-1 + b6depit-1 + b71productivityit-1 × Type1  
+ b72productivityit-1 × (1 - Type1) + vj + vt + vp + vo + eit   (2) 
 
We then further split the full sample of firm-years by their size and age together, and their 
export status by estimating eq. (2). Type1 is a dummy variable indicating firms being small 
and young
9
 in industry j and year t, and exporting products overseas in year t in separate 
regressions. Beck et al. (2006) find strong evidence from a large panel of firms from 80 
countries that size and age are useful indicators of financing constraints. Casey and O’Toole 
(2014) also find from Euro area counties that size and age influence firms accessibility of 
different types of finance, i.e. larger and older firms are more likely to use finance of higher 
pecking order. Thus, we try to find out whether productivity is more helpful for small young 
firms or for larger and/or older firms.  
Only productive firms are able to export due to the large sunk cost of exporting 
(Melitz, 2003). Therefore, export status could be a natural indicator of firms’ quality. Less 
financial constraints or more availability of finance enables export as well (see Wagner 2014 
for early survey, and Muûls, 2015 among others). The export, productivity and finance nexus 
has also been an increasingly popular research area recently, e.g. Egger and Keuschnigg 
(2017). We are the first trying to explore further by testing whether exporters with high 
productivity get more external finance. Both size age and exporting status dimensions 
somewhat indicate firms’ perceived or true quality. We are interested to find out how firms’ 
productivity interact with these measures and exert any effect on their ability of increasing 
external finance.  
 
Our regression models are likely to suffer from endogeneity problems, and we therefore lag 
all the independent variables by one period to treat the problem. We further control for the 
possible simultaneity and endogeneity problems by using the system generalised method of 
moments (GMM), in which we treat all the regressors as endogenous and instrument them 
                                                 
9
 A firm is defined as small young if its real sales is ranked in the bottom 50 percentile of the real sales 
distribution of all firms in the same 2-digit industry and in the same year, and if its age is ranked in the bottom 
50 percentile of the age distribution of all firms in the same 2-digit industry. Firm age is defined at the beginning 
of the year.  
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using their own lagged variables.
10
 Year dummies, two-digit industry dummies, province 
dummies and ownership dummies are included in all the regressions and instrument sets. 
Since finance measures are found to be able to increase firms’ TFP (e.g. Chen and Guariglia, 
2013), we cautiously make sure if productivity helps firms to increase their external finance, 
the effects are not driven simply by the correlations between the two variables. We therefore 
further establish the casual effect of productivity on external finance by utilising the 
difference-in-difference method following an exogenous industrial policy shock.  
 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
4.1. Data Sample  
 
Our data is from the China stock market financial statements database (CSMAR), which 
contains financial statement information for all listed firms in China’s stock market. Due to 
accounting standards and stock market regulation changes, and data collection issues, some 
of our key variables only became available from 2003
11
. Our sample firms are manufacturing 
firms located in 30 provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities of China.  
To control for the bias caused by outliers we winsorise the one percent tails of the 
distribution of all variables included in our regressions except the following. Only the top one 
percent for the long-term debt (only in the long-term debt ratio regressions) and depreciation, 
and their observations with negative values are winsorised. Only the bottom one percent and 
the values larger than 1 of tangibility are winsorised. We leave out firms with less than three-
year consecutive observations, which is a common practice for dynamic models, as well as 
firms that do not have complete information on our regression variables. Finally, our 
unbalanced panel covers 1591 listed firms with 12618 firm-year observations. Our dynamic 
model equation leaves our sample ranging from 2003-2016. Observations in each year range 
from a minimum of 527 in 2016 to a maximum of 1468 in 2015.
12
 
 
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
 
                                                 
10
 We use the lagged level variables of the endogenous regressors in the differenced equations and the lagged 
difference variables in the level equations as the instruments.  
11
 Export data appears in various forms for different firms and is extracted from a set of assorted firm level 
information.   
12
 See the appendix A.1 for more information on the structure of our panel. 
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Column 1 of table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of all the variables in the whole sample, 
and column 2 to 4 report the statistics of private and the rest of the firm-years. About 45% of 
the total firm-years are private
13
. The t-tests in column 4, which show the significance of the 
mean difference between the private sample in column 2 and the rest of the sample in column 
3, indicate that all variables except ACF TFP and labour productivity are significantly 
different between the two groups. Private firms have lower leverage, long-term debt ratio, 
sales, tangibility and depreciation, but they issue more new equity, grow faster, and are more 
profitable and more labour intensive comparing with other firms. Their productivity 
comparing with other firms is however ambiguous. The long-term debt dummy shows the 
proportion of firms having positive long-term debt. A sizable proportion of firms in all 
categories do not have any long-term debt at all, and a significantly smaller proportion of 
private firms have any long-term debt than other firms, which may be due to their inability to 
borrow, as they are more likely to be discriminated in the Chinese financial market. This is 
consistent with the pecking order theory, which suggests that under information asymmetries 
due to the higher costs and uncertainty of long-term finance, only high quality firms may be 
able to obtain external long-term finance. Private firms’ liquidity and coverage ratio are more 
than double of those of others, which might show a better financial position of private firms. 
However, in the meanwhile they could also indicate precautionary internal finance buffer 
possibly because private firms are unable to secure external finance when they need. Overall, 
private firms seem to perform better and financially heathier, even though they seem to be 
disadvantaged in obtaining external borrowing. Perhaps due to their high labour intensity, 
private firms’ labour productivity is only marginally higher than others’.  
Column 5 to 7 compare small young firm-years with the rest. Small young firm-years 
take up about 24.8% of all firm-years. They are much lower in all three measures of external 
finance. Only a small proportion of them have long-term debt. They are also significantly less 
productive by all measures of TFP and labour productivity. Their asset growth is similar with 
others. They are much less profitable, have lower depreciation and are more labour intensive. 
Considering their lower external finance even with higher tangibility, we may suspect that 
small young firms do have difficulty in obtaining external finance. Small young firms are 
significantly more liquid, though their coverage ratio is similar with other firms. High 
liquidity could mean a good internal financial position, but on the other hand, it could also be 
a result of inability of obtaining external finance and consequently indicates more reliance of 
                                                 
13
 Firms’ ownerships are defined by their ultimate controlling shareholder.  
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internal finance, especially when these firms also have lower performance indicators. Overall, 
small young firms seem to have worse quality than others. This important observation may 
suggest that the information asymmetry problem may be well at work among China’s listed 
manufacturing firms, where small young firms suffer more. We try to explore whether 
conventional proxies for information asymmetries, i.e. firm size and age, would make a 
difference for the effects of firm productivity in helping raising external finance. 
We also divide our sample firm-years according to whether firms export to overseas 
markets in a particular year
14
. 57.4% of our sample firm-years export and 42.6% do not. All 
of our indicators are significantly different between exporters and non-exporters. Exporters 
have higher leverage and long-term debt, but lower new equity. There is a bigger proportion 
of exporters having positive long-term debt than non-exporters. Exporters are generally more 
productive than non-exporters by three out of four measures of productivity. Their sales size 
is larger, asset growth almost double of the non-exporters, and their profitability much higher. 
Exporters are less tangible on average. Their depreciation is only slightly higher. They also 
have much higher liquidity and coverage ratio. Overall, exporting manufacturing firms in our 
sample seem to have better quality, and with better internal financial position, they seem to 
rely more on equity finance, but do not seem to use more borrowing.  
Generally, the descriptive statistics provide some preliminary evidence that higher 
productivity tend to be associated with higher equity finance, but not necessarily with higher 
leverage or long-term debt. The characteristics of firm ownership, size and age, export status 
all play a role in influencing firms’ performance and finance. We also notice that in our 
sample high growth firms tend to have less long-term debt, which is in line with Barclay and 
Smith’s (1995) finding that high growth firms prefer to use short-term debt.  
 
5. Results 
 
In this section, we provide a more detailed analysis of the link between productivity and 
external finance, and the extent to which the characteristics of firm ownership, size and age, 
and export status affect the sensitivity of three forms of external finance, i.e. total leverage, 
new equity and long-term debt, to productivity, i.e. three measures of TFP as well as labour 
productivity. 
                                                 
F
14
 Some of our sample firms do switch between exporters and non-exporters, but it is extremely rare that they 
changed frequently or dramatically in terms of export sales during the sample period. In order to capture 
particularly firms’ switch from non-exporter to exporter, which is likely due to productivity improvement 
according to Melitz (2003), we define firms’ export status by year.  
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5.1. Productivity effects on firms’ total leverage 
 
First, in column 1 to 3 of table 2 we estimate eq. (1) with three measures of TFP and total 
leverage and show the results for the full sample. Only Wooldridge TFP has a significant 
positive effect on firms’ total leverage. In column 4 of table 2 we show the full sample results 
using labour productivity, which has no effect on firms’ leverage. Labour productivity does 
not measure other aspects of firms’ efficiency than the labour input, but it can be easily 
measured and readily available to external finance providers. However, the simple 
measurement of labour productivity may bias towards capital-intensive firms. Especially the 
Chinese export sector is dominated by labour intensive industries, which are better at 
producing labour intensive goods than non-exporters, but they might not be efficient in terms 
of other aspects of production. Therefore, to account for the possible differences of labour 
intensity when examining the effect of labour productivity, we add a ratio of firms’ total 
wage bill to sales to the labour productivity regressions.  
To further eliminate potential influence of firms’ ownerships, we produce the above 
regressions on private firm sample and report the results in column 5 to 8 in table 2. Only the 
Wooldridge and ACF TFP have significant positive effects on leverage, and it is evident that 
these results are not subject to firms’ ownership influence.  
Other variables are all reasonable and remarkably consistent between the whole and 
private samples. The lagged leverage variable has a large positive and significant coefficient 
suggesting an obvious dynamic behaviour. The effect of firm size is not totally clear as 
suggested by different regressions. While large firms may be able to borrow more since they 
are less likely to suffer from information asymmetry problems, they may also be more self-
sufficient and rely less on external borrowing. Fixed asset growth has negative significant 
effects on leverage, which is consistent with the prediction of agency theory, where high 
growth firms prefer to reduce leverage to control for agency cost associated with managers’ 
misbehaviour arising from the growth opportunities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Tangibility 
also plays a significant positive role in determining leverage, as tangible assets could serve as 
collateral for external finance. Profitability has a negative but insignificant effect. 
Depreciation ratio, to control the possibility that firms may depreciate their assets to shield 
off some tax instead of using debt for the same purpose, also reduces leverage as expected.  
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m3 and Hansen tests show that all of our system GMM regressions are appropriate. 
Overall, we find some positive effects of productivity on firms’ leverage. To further verify 
the robustness of this result, we also use the change of total leverage, current leverage and 
short-term debt ratio as the dependent variables. Since an increase in total leverage could be 
due to an increase in total liabilities or a decrease in total assets, using total leverage as a 
measure may not correctly capture firms’ borrowing behaviour. Therefore, we also use the 
change of total liabilities over total assets ratio, and the results in table A4 is remarkably 
consistent with table 2. Results in table A5 and A6 also show that productivity has little effect 
in helping firms with short-term borrowing. This is reasonable, as short-term lenders might 
not worry about firms’ long-term performance like productivity, instead they would care 
more about firms’ ability in repaying the debts in the short term like some balance sheet 
indicators. 
 
5.2. Productivity effects on firms’ new issue of equity 
 
Though equity finance may be less favoured than debt finance by firms since issuing new 
equity is more costly according to the pecking order theory, our sample firms on average 
have a total shareholders’ equity to total assets ratio of 0.413, whereas their average total 
outstanding long-term debt to total assets ratio is only 0.054. As shown in table 1 new issue 
of equity ratio is higher than long-term debt ratio for every category of firms. It seems that 
equity finance is a highly important form of external finance for Chinese listed firms. 
Therefore, it is vital for us to explore how productivity affect different types of external 
finance.  
In Table 3 we find highly significant and positive productivity effects for firms’ new 
equity in all the regressions, suggesting high productivity helps firms to raise more equity 
finance. Comparing with table 2, the coefficients of some of the control variables have 
opposite signs, i.e. the lagged new equity variable, ROA and depreciation ratio, but are still 
all reasonable. The lagged new equity variable is negative and significant in all the 
regressions, which suggests a correction behaviour of firms’ new equity issues, as firms often 
wish to maintain a smooth stream of new equity issuance (Bolton, et al., 2013). Comparing 
with table 2, ROA has a positive effect instead, which is sensible. High profit could be a 
substitute for debt, but more attractive to investors and makes issuing new equity easy. 
Depreciation is positive and significant as expected, opposite its signs in the leverage 
regressions in table 2. While depreciation is an alternative tax shield substituting for debt, it 
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reduces retained earnings and induces firms to issue equity. Again, the private firm sample 
has highly consistent results with the whole sample, and all the tests show our regressions are 
appropriate. We seem to find strong evidence that equity finance goes to the more productive 
firms.  
 
5.3. Productivity effects on firms’ long-term debt 
 
We then further explore the effect of productivity on another major form of external finance, 
long-term debt, which is defined as firms’ borrowing from banks or other financial 
institutions with a maturity over a year. Such long-term debt would be costly for firms to 
obtain. Figures in table 1 show that our sample firms’ long-term debt is only about 10% of 
their total liabilities
15
 on average for all categories of firms. On the other hand, short-term 
finance such as trade credit and overdraft credit lines would be relatively easy to get and do 
not necessarily involve borrowers’ particular effort for each borrowing. Thus, it is important 
to check firms’ long-term debt without the influence of other forms of more easily accessible 
short-term finance.  
Table 4 shows the effects of productivity on firms’ long-term debt. Only LP TFP and 
labour productivity models for the whole sample, and ACF TFP and labour productivity 
models for the private sample show positive significant productivity effects. All other control 
variables show sensible and consistent results in both samples. All the tests suggest our 
regression models are appropriate. Overall, our results suggest that productivity helps firms to 
raise long-term debt to some extent, but the effect is not as strong as the one on firms’ new 
equity finance. 
 
In general, we find that productivity does help firms to raise external finance, 
especially new equity finance, but the effect is slightly weaker on leverage and long-term 
debt. To check more robustness of our results, we also use the three-year moving average of 
all the four measures of productivity as our dependent variables, so that our results are more 
independent from the volatility of productivity, i.e. less influenced by the predictability of 
past productivity for future productivity. As showed in table A7, A8 and A9 the productivity 
effects are consistent and even much stronger. 
 
                                                 
15
 We use the long-term debt ratio in the 3
rd
 row of table 1 to divide the leverage in the 1
st
 row to calculate the 
relative size of long-term debt to total liabilities.  
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5.4 Does the productivity effect vary? 
 
Now we try to explore in more details whether the productivity and external finance nexus 
differ along some dimensions of firm characteristics. First, we split our sample firms by their 
size and age together. Firms, which are in the lower half of the distribution of both real sales 
and age of all the firms in the same year and same industry, are classified as small young 
firms
16
. Small young firms in our sample indeed have less external finance, and lower values 
in performance indicators than others as shown in table 1.  
Then we also split our sample into exporters and non-exporter. Many foreign invested 
manufacturing firms in low labour cost countries are established with the sole purpose of 
exporting their products back to foreign markets, which suggest that these firms do not have 
to bear the sunk cost of export and may not necessarily have better quality than their domestic 
counterparts. However, we do not have such concern, since 95.75% of our sample firms are 
domestic firms
17
, i.e. exporters in our sample are most likely to be the genuine productive 
exporters as Melitz (2003) models. Figures in table 1 show that exporters and non-exporters 
are highly distinctive from each other, and exporters do seem to have better performance.  
Table 5 presents the results of eq. (2). Big and/or old firms have a positive significant 
productivity effect on their leverage only by the Wooldridge TFP regression in column 2, 
where large and/or old firms have a significantly higher TFP effects on their leverage than 
small young firms as shown by the significant χ
2
 statistics. Exporters show some marginally 
higher positive significant TFP effects on leverage than non-exporters by the Wooldridge and 
ACF TFP regressions in column 6 and 7. These results are much in line with the whole 
sample results in table 2. Labour productivity has no effect on leverage for any of the firm 
groups. All the tests show that our regressions are reasonable, and control variables are all 
sensible too. Overall, we see some weak evidence that it is the better quality firm groups 
being able to utilise TFP to increase leverage, and labour productivity does not seem to help. 
Table 6 shows the sample splitting tests of eq. (2) on firms’ new equity. All groups of 
firms attract positive and highly significant productivity effects on new equity. It is the big 
and/or old firms and exporters always have stronger effects than their respective counterparts, 
as shown by the significant χ
2
 tests for all the regressions. The results are persistent and 
robust. Again, all the tests indicate appropriate regressions. Therefore, we may be confident 
                                                 
16
 Firms’ size and age effects are related to the nature of the industry, business cycle, life cycle of the industry 
etc. Therefore, we take into account of industry and year when defining firms to be small and young.  
17
 More details of the ownership structure of our sample firm-years can be found in table A3 in the appendix.  
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to summarise that productivity helps firms to raise new equity finance. Big and/or old firms 
and exporters are able to better utilise productivity to issue more new equities than small 
young firms and non-exporters respectively.  
Finally, table 7 shows the test results of productivity on firms’ long-term debt ratio. 
All measures of TFP do not seem to have any effect on firms’ long-term debt borrowing for 
all the groups. However, column 4 shows that big and/or old firms have a significantly higher 
labour productivity effect on long-term debt than small young firms. Column 8 shows that 
labour productivity helps both exporter and non-exporters to raise long-term debt, though the 
effects are similar. Again, all of our control variables are reasonable and regression models 
are all appropriate.  
 
      6. Exogenous policy shock  
 
Despite the advantage of system GMM estimator in controlling endogeneity problems in our 
models, we make use of an exogenous industrial policy shock on productivity of firms in 
some sectors and use a difference-in-difference (DID hereafter) approach to shed some 
further lights on the causality between productivity and external finance.  
The Chinese policy makers believe that some industrial sectors have produced far 
more than the demand of the market, and have been trying to intervene in the production 
market. The Chinese government issued the ‘Notice of the State Council on Further 
Strengthening the Elimination of Backward Production Capacities’ (No. 7 [2010] of the State 
Council) (the Notice hereafter) in June 2010
18
. This Notice aims to reduce production in 
sectors including electricity, coke, iron and steel, nonferrous metal, construction materials 
(particularly cement), some light industries (mainly paper making and leather), and textile. It 
details various means by the government in an attempt to reduce output in those sectors, such 
as direct closure and demolishing of production facilities and equipment, increasing the entry 
requirement, environmental standards, product standards, and monitoring, and etc. For 
example, the Notice requires firms must retire some production lines with certain old 
technologies or of very small production capacity. Such measures by the government would 
damage the productivity in those industries and are completely out of the control of the firms, 
                                                 
18
 The full text of the Notice in Chinese is available in the Chinese central government website 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-04/06/content_1573880.htm 
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and we thus may regard it as an exogenous shock to the firms and expect a drop in 
productivity for firms in those affected industries.  
Following Ding et al. (2018) we use a DID approach to explore the effects of such 
exogenous shock on firms’ external finance by estimating the following equation 
 
 extfinanceit = α + β Treati + γ Postpolicyt + θ Treati × Postpolicyt  +  vp + vo + eit      (3)
  
where extfinanceit includes total leverage, new equity and long-term debt variables 
respectively in separate regressions. Treati is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i is from the 
treatment group, i.e. in one of the industries that are affected by the policy
19
, and 0 otherwise. 
Postpolicyt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is in the post-treatment period, 
i.e. in or after 2012. The Notice specifies that those productivity-damaging measures in those 
industries have to be implemented by the end of 2011
20
. Therefore, we regard 2010 and 2011 
as our treatment period, and 2012 onwards as post-treatment period. We also include 
province and ownership dummies, vp and vo. eit is an idiosyncratic error term. The strict 
exogenous assumption of DID implies that θ is the DID treatment effect of the policy shock 
we examine, i.e. the effect of the policy on the treatment group. Specifically,  
 
θ = {E[extfinanceit | Treati = 1, Postpolicyt = 1] - E[extfinanceit | Treati = 1, Postpolicyt = 0]} 
- {E[extfinanceit | Treati = 0, Postpolicyt = 1] - E[extfinanceit | Treati = 0, Postpolicyt = 0]} (4) 
 
β is the difference between the treatment and non-treatment groups during the pre-policy 
period, i.e. 2009 and before, and γ  is the change after the implementation of the policy for the 
non-treatment group. More specifically,  
 
β = E[extfinanceit | Treati = 1, Postpolicyt = 0] - E[extfinanceit | Treati = 0, Postpolicyt = 0] (5) 
 
                                                 
19
 In our sample the treatment group includes firms in the following industries: cement and asbestine cement 
products; coking; metal products; paper making and paper products; production of leather, fur down and related 
products; smelting and pressing of ferrous metals; smelting and pressing of nonferrous metal; and textile.  
20
 According to the Notice the only exception is the cement sector, which was allowed to comply with the new 
regulation by the end of 2012. However, the proportion of cement firms in our sample is small and it is more 
reasonable to use 2010 and 2011 as the treatment period.  
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γ = E[extfinanceit | Treati = 0, Postpolicyt = 1] - E[extfinanceit | Treati = 0, Postpolicyt = 0] (6) 
 
The results of the DID regressions in eq. (3) are reported in table 8. Before the policy 
shock, firms in the treatment sectors have 4.1% and 2.7% (β) higher leverage and long-term 
debt respectively, but 2.4% less new equity comparing to firms in other sectors. The policy 
shock has a particularly significant negative effect on firms’ long-term debt, which is reduced 
by 2.6% (γ + θ) in those treatment industries compared to the pre-policy period. The 
reduction is also 1.7% (θ) more than firms in other non-treatment industries. However, the 
treatment effect (θ) for the total leverage and new equity is not particularly obvious.  
We then split our sample into small young firms versus other firms and exporters 
versus non-exporters, and run the regressions of eq. (3) for each type of external finance. The 
results are presented in table 9. The policy shock does not have a significant treatment effect 
(θ) on leverage for all the sub-groups as shown in column 1 and 2. In the new equity 
regressions in panel A of column 3 and 4, large and/or old firms have a strong treatment 
effect, whereas small young firms do not. In panel B, neither exporters nor non-exporters 
have any significant treatment effects. In column 5 and 6, large and/or old firms have a 
significant negative treatment effect on long-term debt, whereas small young firms do not. 
Exporters have a significant negative treatment effect on long-term debt, whereas non-
exporters do not. These results are consistent with our GMM regression results, i.e. the 
external finance of large and/or old firms and exporters is more responsive to their 
productivity.  
Overall, our DID results confirm the causality from productivity to external finance, and 
provide additional support for the validity of our main GMM regression results. In particular, 
we find this productivity-damaging policy significantly reduces external finance for firms in 
the affected industries relative to other firms. Such effects exist for the better quality large 
and/old firms and exporters, but not for their respective counterparts.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Using a panel of 1591 Chinese listed manufacturing firms between year 2003-2016 we find 
that productivity measured by three TFP estimation methods and labour productivity is 
statistically and economically important and positive in determining firms’ external finance, 
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i.e. total leverage, new issue of equity and long-term debt. We find strong and robust results 
that productivity is helpful for firms to raise new equity finance, but some weaker results for 
total leverage and long-term debt. Such results hold for both the whole sample and private 
firms separately. Our findings are sensible that external lenders would be most interested in 
firms’ ability in repaying debt, and less interested in how efficient firms are. On the other 
hand, equity investors would be most interested in firms’ long-term operation as productive 
firms are more likely to give them better return in the long run. Therefore, productivity that 
indicates firms’ overall quality would matter more for equity investors and perhaps less for 
debt lenders as our results show.  
We also find that large and/or old firms and exporting firms are able to make better 
use of their productivity to gain external finance than their respective counterparts, i.e. small 
young firms and non-exporting firms. Again, the results are mainly valid for new equity 
finance, but not quite for total leverage and long-term debt. Large and/or old firms are less 
likely to suffer from information asymmetry problems, and are often perceived to have better 
quality than small young firms by outsiders. Exporters are also more likely to be the better 
firms than non-exporters given the fact that they can afford the substantial sunk cost of 
exporting. Thus, our results also suggest that better firms are able to utilise productivity more 
to gain external finance.  
We further confirm the causality of our results by using DID regressions following an 
exogenous industrial policy shock during year 2010-2011. We find that this productivity-
damaging policy indeed reduces external finance for firms in the affected industries.  
Our research suggests a highly important relationship in the financial market, i.e. 
despite the presence of information asymmetry, productive good firms do get more external 
finance. This is an encouraging discovery of a possible virtuous circle between productivity 
and finance. In addition our sample splitting test results give a further important implication 
that productivity not only enables all firms to raise external finance, the mechanism also 
forces financial resources to shift towards the better quality firms and away from 
unproductive firms. 
Overall, our findings suggest that productivity is a good indicator of firms’ quality in 
the financial market, which could possibly reduce the information asymmetry problem to 
some extent. If government policies and regulations may target at channelling financial 
resources to productive firms, it will contribute to improve aggregate productivity and is 
certainly beneficial to an economy’s sustainable growth in the long term. Such mechanism 
would also contribute to a more sustainable financial system itself, given that lenders and 
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investors may find their funds exposed to less risk in the hands of truly efficient firms. A 
well-functioning financial market, even if it is frictional and costly for firms to access, always 
generates a welfare gain. This is however beyond the scope of this paper, and can be proved 
in a future study. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix  
 
A.1. Panel data structure 
 
Table A1. Panel year structure  
 
Year Number of observations Percent Cumulative 
2003 587 4.65 4.65 
2004 659 5.22 9.87 
2005 688 5.45 15.33 
2006 749 5.94 21.26 
2007 750 5.94 27.21 
2008 802 6.36 33.56 
2009 759 6.02 39.58 
2010 782 6.20 45.78 
2011 879 6.97 52.74 
2012 1187 9.41 62.15 
2013 1349 10.69 72.84 
2014 1432 11.35 84.19 
2015 1468 11.63 95.82 
2016 527 4.18 100.00 
Total 12618 100.00  
 
Table A2. Panel years per firm structure  
 
Number of years per firm Number of observations Percent Cumulative 
4 44 0.35 0.35 
5 102 0.81 1.16 
6 374 2.96 4.12 
7 791 6.27 10.39 
8 794 6.29 16.68 
9 345 2.73 19.42 
10 308 2.44 21.86 
11 501 3.97 25.83 
12 308 2.44 28.27 
13 406 3.22 31.49 
14 503 3.99 35.47 
15 465 3.69 39.16 
16 3398 26.93 66.09 
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17 4279 33.91 100.00 
Total 12618 100.00  
 
Table A3. Panel ownership structure  
 
Ownership types Number of observations Percent Cumulative 
Central state 3001 23.78 23.78 
Lower level state 2903 23.01 46.79 
Domestic private 5672 44.95 91.74 
Foreign  536 4.25 95.99 
Others  506 4.01 100.00 
Total 12618 100.00  
A.2. Variable definitions 
 
TFP_LP: estimated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method with the revenue function, 
applied separately to each 2-digit manufacturing industrial group. The levpet Stata 
command was used in estimation. Also see Chen and Guariglia (2011) for more 
discussions. We use firms’ real total operating revenue as the proxy for revenue, real 
operating expense for intermediate input, real net fixed assets for capital and total number 
of employees for labour.  
TFP_Wooldridge: estimated using the Wooldridge (2009) GMM method applied separately 
for each 2-digit manufacturing industrial group. The prodest Stata command was used in 
estimation. We use real total operating revenue for revenue, total number of employee for 
labour, real net fixed assets for capital, and following Imrohoroglu and Tüzel (2014) by 
using (operating cost – total wage) in real term for intermediate input and (total operating 
revenue – intermediate input) in real term for output (added value).  
TFP_acf: estimated using the Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) method applied separately 
for each 2-digit manufacturing industrial group. The prodest Stata command was used in 
estimation. The definition of the variables is the same as the TFP_Wooldridge.  
Labour productivity: real sales / number of employee 
Sales: operational revenue 
Leverage: total liabilities / total assets 
New equity: [(change of total shareholders’ equity from year t-1 to t) – (change of retained 
earnings from t-1 to t)] / total assets at t-1. This definition follows Baker, Stein and 
Wurgler (2003).  
Long-term debt: firms’ outstanding long-term debt with maturity over 12 months / total assets 
Asset growth: change of the logarithm of net fixed assets from t-1 to t 
Tangibility: total tangible assets / total assets 
Roa: net profit / total assets 
Depreciation: depreciation of fixed assets, oil and gas assets and bearer biological assets 
Labour intensity: cash paid to and on behalf of employees, including pay to retired staff / 
operational revenue 
Liquidity: (current assets – current liabilities) / total assets 
Coverage ratio: net profit / current liabilities 
Deflators: taken from the China Statistical Yearbook (various issues), which are published by 
the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The provincial capital goods deflator was used 
to deflate the capital stock, and the provincial producer price indices (PPI) for 
manufactured goods to deflate other variables, e.g. sales. 
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A.3 More robustness check results 
 
Table A4: The effect of productivity on the changes of total leverage  
 
dependent variable: 
Δleverageit 
All Private 
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Δleveragei,t-1 
0.035 
(0.062) 
0.025 
(0.054) 
0.014 
(0.060) 
0.015 
(0.059) 
0.133 
(0.096) 
0.157 
(0.100) 
0.026 
(0.067) 
0.117 
(0.077) 
logSit-1 
-0.000 
(0.007) 
-0.053** 
(0.022) 
-0.017* 
(0.009) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.065** 
(0.029) 
-0.017 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
asset growthit-1 
-0.005 
(0.030) 
-0.007 
(0.025) 
-0.010 
(0.030) 
-0.005 
(0.029) 
-0.063 
(0.042) 
-0.076* 
(0.041) 
-0.027 
(0.032) 
-0.061* 
(0.033) 
tangibilityit-1 
0.063 
(0.105) 
0.098 
(0.101) 
0.130 
(0.119) 
-0.058 
(0.097) 
0.208 
(0.176) 
0.324* 
(0.201) 
0.140 
(0.148) 
0.082 
(0.152) 
roait-1 
0.613*** 
(0.173) 
0.802*** 
(0.143) 
0.708*** 
(0.145) 
0.804*** 
(0.166) 
0.840*** 
(0.282) 
0.770*** 
(0.283) 
0.705*** 
(0.179) 
0.663*** 
(0.201) 
depit-1 
-0.394 
(0.899) 
-0.144 
(0.817) 
-0.109 
(0.890) 
0.433 
(0.849) 
-3.080* 
(1.747) 
-2.719 
(1.692) 
-0.560 
(1.187) 
-1.949 
(1.573) 
logtfpit-1 
0.100 
(0.061) 
1.359** 
(0.644) 
0.471** 
(0.195) 
 
0.001 
(0.075) 
1.688** 
(0.816) 
0.457* 
(0.255) 
 
labour intensityit-1    
0.108 
(0.194) 
   
0.341 
(0.308) 
loglpit-1    
0.011 
(0.013) 
   
0.034* 
(0.019) 
m2 (p-value)        0.764 
m3 (p-value) 0.816 0.742 0.788 0.632 0.917 0.867 0.970  
J (Hansen) 0.123 0.408 0.104 0.193 0.633 0.528 0.578 0.299 
IVs (lags) 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-2,… 
Δt-1… 
number of observations 12618 12623 12623 12624 5672 5674 5674 5676 
 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using system GMM estimators. i indexes firms; and t, time. All the 
regressions include year dummies, industry dummies which are at 2 digit level, and province dummies which 
indicate the location of firms’ headquarter. The whole sample regressions also include ownership dummies. The 
figures reported in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. m2 and m3 are tests for second- and third-order 
serial correlations in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. J tests show the validity of the instrument sets. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. Also see Notes to Table 1. 
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Table A5: The effect of productivity on current leverage  
 
dependent variable: 
current leverageit 
All Private  
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
current leveragei,t-1 
0.661*** 
(0.037) 
0.621*** 
(0.039) 
0.610*** 
(0.040) 
0.631*** 
(0.038) 
0.730*** 
(0.062) 
0.737*** 
(0.061) 
0.720*** 
(0.061) 
0.711*** 
(0.053) 
logSit-1 
0.012* 
(0.006) 
-0.036 
(0.025) 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
0.020*** 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
0.026 
(0.058) 
-0.002 
(0.016) 
0.004 
(0.012) 
asset growthit-1 
-0.154*** 
(0.023) 
-0.183*** 
(0.024) 
-0.180*** 
(0.026) 
-0.157*** 
(0.022) 
-0.174*** 
(0.039) 
-0.202*** 
(0.039) 
-0.202*** 
(0.042) 
-0.157*** 
(0.037) 
tangibilityit-1 
0.320*** 
(0.099) 
0.422*** 
(0.117) 
0.424*** 
(0.124) 
0.374*** 
(0.094) 
0.406** 
(0.183) 
0.475** 
(0.196) 
0.482** 
(0.191) 
0.504*** 
(0.170) 
roait-1 
-0.132 
(0.172) 
-0.580*** 
(0.161) 
-0.504*** 
(0.161) 
-0.128 
(0.137) 
-0.324 
(0.242) 
-0.351 
(0.229) 
-0.362 
(0.226) 
-0.142 
(0.212) 
depit-1 
-3.912*** 
(0.811) 
-3.112*** 
(0.864) 
-3.285*** 
(0.835) 
-4.059*** 
(0.785) 
-4.233** 
(1.808) 
-5.455*** 
(1.718) 
-4.948*** 
(1.670) 
-4.754*** 
(1.643) 
logtfpit-1 
-0.070 
(0.063) 
1.367* 
(0.701) 
0.384* 
(0.231) 
 
-0.003 
(0.078) 
-0.667 
(1.545) 
0.131 
(0.326) 
 
labour intensityit-1    
0.245 
(0.182) 
   
0.110 
(0.329) 
loglpit-1    
-0.015 
(0.012) 
   
-0.004 
(0.024) 
m3 (p-value) 0.933   0.936 0.668 0.699 0.716 0.577 
m4 (p-value)  0.957 0.955      
J (Hansen) 0.146 0.260 0.117 0.209 0.544 0.392 0.352 0.149 
IVs (lags) 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-4,… 
Δt-3… 
t-4,… 
Δt-3… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
number of observations 12616 12621 12623 12622 5671 5673 5673 5675 
 
Notes: see notes to table 1 and 2.  
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Table A6: The effect of productivity on short-term debt  
 
dependent variable: 
stdit 
All Private  
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
stdi,t-1 
0.643*** 
(0.055) 
0.676*** 
(0.030) 
0.704*** 
(0.044) 
0.615*** 
(0.055) 
0.579*** 
(0.049) 
0.635*** 
(0.062) 
0.504*** 
(0.049) 
0.642*** 
(0.059) 
logSit-1 
0.009** 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.007*** 
(0.004) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
asset growthit-1 
-0.035* 
(0.019) 
-0.029*** 
(0.010) 
-0.045** 
(0.018) 
-0.042** 
(0.019) 
-0.046*** 
(0.015) 
-0.048*** 
(0.017) 
-0.043*** 
(0.013) 
-0.039** 
(0.019) 
tangibilityit-1 
0.228*** 
(0.075) 
0.191*** 
(0.050) 
0.238*** 
(0.086) 
0.262*** 
(0.061) 
0.343*** 
(0.082) 
0.459*** 
(0.111) 
0.269*** 
(0.103) 
0.387*** 
(0.101) 
roait-1 
-0.248** 
(0.108) 
-0.016 
(0.074) 
0.187* 
(0.109) 
-0.234** 
(0.102) 
0.008 
(0.096) 
0.049 
(0.131) 
-0.024 
(0.074) 
0.081 
(0.135) 
depit-1 
-2.097*** 
(0.609) 
-1.304*** 
(0.389) 
-1.664** 
(0.658) 
-2.148*** 
(0.563) 
-2.685*** 
(0.770) 
-3.346*** 
(0.939) 
-1.761** 
(0.803) 
-3.168*** 
(0.964) 
logtfpit-1 
-0.049 
(0.040) 
-0.066 
(0.239) 
-0.005 
(0.106) 
 
-0.016 
(0.027) 
0.269 
(0.344) 
-0.044 
(0.121) 
 
labour intensityit-1    
-0.103 
(0.139) 
   
-0.011 
(0.172) 
loglpit-1    
-0.012 
(0.009) 
   
-0.013 
(0.012) 
m3 (p-value)  0.781 0.615  0.638 0.61 0.768 0.606 
m4 (p-value) 0.796   0.846     
J (Hansen) 0. 412 0.118 0.125 0.145 0.292 0.776 0.977 0.648 
IVs (lags) 
t-4,… 
Δt-3… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-4,… 
Δt-3… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
number of observations 12614 12619 12619 12620 5672 5674 5674 5676 
 
Notes: see notes to table 1 and 2.  
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Table A7: The effect of productivity (moving average) on total leverage  
 
dependent variable: 
total leverageit 
All Private  
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
total leveragei,t-1 
0.663*** 
(0.037) 
0.676*** 
(0.034) 
0.646*** 
(0.034) 
0.639*** 
(0.037) 
0.695*** 
(0.043) 
0.671*** 
(0.041) 
0.664*** 
(0.045) 
0.632*** 
(0.047) 
logSit-1 
0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.137*** 
(0.030) 
-0.021* 
(0.012) 
0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
-0.127*** 
(0.031) 
-0.037*** 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
asset growthit-1 
-0.231*** 
(0.031) 
-0.226*** 
(0.030) 
-0.231*** 
(0.032) 
-0.249*** 
(0.030) 
-0.197*** 
(0.027) 
-0.168*** 
(0.026) 
-0.186*** 
(0.027) 
-0.159*** 
(0.025) 
tangibilityit-1 
0.666*** 
(0.113) 
0.935*** 
(0.130) 
0.803*** 
(0.133) 
0.693*** 
(0.115) 
0.949*** 
(0.139) 
1.049*** 
(0.150) 
1.016*** 
(0.159) 
0.869*** 
(0.139) 
roait-1 
-0.517** 
(0.200) 
-0.338* 
(0.192) 
-0.451** 
(0.196) 
-0.314* 
(0.170) 
-0.321 
(0.195) 
-0.225 
(0.175) 
-0.241 
(0.176) 
-0.223 
(0.168) 
depit-1 
-5.968*** 
(0.952) 
-6.077*** 
(0.925) 
-5.380*** 
(0.942) 
-6.147*** 
(1.003) 
-7.885*** 
(1.279) 
-6.909*** 
(1.238) 
-7.267*** 
(1.331) 
-6.737*** 
(1.196) 
logtfpit-1 
0.226*** 
(0.068) 
4.226*** 
(0.796) 
0.914*** 
(0.231) 
 
0.204** 
(0.084) 
3.568*** 
(0.866) 
0.848*** 
(0.278) 
 
labour intensityit-1    
0.595** 
(0.261) 
   
0.594*** 
(0.195) 
loglpit-1    
0.048*** 
(0.017) 
   
0.042** 
(0.020) 
m3 (p-value)     0.692 0.872 0.764 0.729 
m4 (p-value) 0.228 0.153 0.201 0.187     
J (Hansen) 0.092 0.099 0.050 0.163 0.686 0.343 0.526 0.997 
IVs (lags) 
t-4,… 
Δt-3… 
t-4,… 
Δt-3… 
t-4,… 
Δt-3… 
t-4,… 
Δt-3… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
number of observations 13652 13656 13656 13653 6468 6471 6471 6470 
 
Notes: see notes to table 1 and 2. 
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Table A8: The effect of productivity (moving average) on new equity  
 
dependent variable: 
new equityit 
All Private  
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
new equityi,t-1 
0.026 
(0.023) 
0.006*** 
(0.022) 
0.011*** 
(0.022) 
0.010 
(0.023) 
0.029 
(0.032) 
0.041 
(0.034) 
0.066* 
(0.035) 
0.085** 
(0.037) 
logSit-1 
-0.031 
(0.007) 
-0.174*** 
(0.024) 
-0.073*** 
(0.011) 
-0.048*** 
(0.009) 
-0.049*** 
(0.012) 
-0.255*** 
(0.050) 
-0.110*** 
(0.021) 
-0.062*** 
(0.016) 
asset growthit-1 
-0.046* 
(0.031) 
-0.054** 
(0.022) 
-0.067*** 
(0.023) 
-0.050** 
(0.020) 
-0.104*** 
(0.028) 
-0.126*** 
(0.037) 
-0.149*** 
(0.038) 
-0.104*** 
(0.037) 
tangibilityit-1 
0.165 
(0.127) 
0.397*** 
(0.109) 
0.462*** 
(0.120) 
0.011 
(0.118) 
0.265 
(0.202) 
0.774*** 
(0.252) 
0.870*** 
(0.271) 
0.463* 
(0.242) 
roait-1 
0.405** 
(0.199) 
0.399** 
(0.161) 
0.416** 
(0.162) 
0.333* 
(0.174) 
0.473** 
(0.233) 
-0.351 
(0.229) 
1.054*** 
(0.284) 
0.703** 
(0.293) 
depit-1 
1.036 
(1.030) 
1.160 
(0.864) 
0.818 
(0.824) 
2.492*** 
(0.956) 
0.641 
(1.562) 
-5.455*** 
(1.718) 
-1.508 
(2.217) 
0.626 
(2.127) 
logtfpit-1 
0.123** 
(0.061) 
3.959*** 
(0.608) 
1.149*** 
(0.179) 
 
0.225** 
(0.088) 
-0.667 
(1.545) 
1.400*** 
(0.303) 
 
labour intensityit-1    
-0.044 
(0.255) 
   
0.668** 
(0.317) 
loglpit-1    
0.068*** 
(0.016) 
   
0.108*** 
(0.020) 
m3 (p-value) 0.672 0.745 0.569 0.260 0.206 0.699 0.388 0.199 
J (Hansen) 0.039 0.169 0.114 0.118 0.607 0.392 0.328 0.555 
IVs (lags) 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
number of observations 13644 13648 13648 13645 6468 6471 6471 6470 
 
Notes: see notes to table 1 and 2. 
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Table A9: The effect of productivity (moving average) on long-term debt  
 
dependent variable: 
ltdit 
All Private  
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ltdi,t-1 
0.689*** 
(0.029) 
0.676*** 
(0.029) 
0.675*** 
(0.030) 
0.010 
(0.023) 
0.616*** 
(0.050) 
0.535*** 
(0.047) 
0.537*** 
(0.049) 
0.085** 
(0.037) 
logSit-1 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.012* 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.048*** 
(0.009) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.017* 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.062*** 
(0.016) 
asset growthit-1 
-0.013 
(0.008) 
-0.020*** 
(0.007) 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
-0.050** 
(0.020) 
-0.019* 
(0.011) 
-0.021** 
(0.008) 
-0.024*** 
(0.007) 
-0.104*** 
(0.037) 
tangibilityit-1 
0.076** 
(0.030) 
0.092*** 
(0.028) 
0.104*** 
(0.028) 
0.011 
(0.118) 
0.033 
(0.041) 
0.083* 
(0.043) 
0.085* 
(0.047) 
0.463* 
(0.242) 
roait-1 
0.129** 
(0.056) 
0.130*** 
(0.043) 
0.137*** 
(0.044) 
0.333* 
(0.174) 
0.034 
(0.070) 
0.088 
(0.054) 
0.073 
(0.052) 
0.703** 
(0.293) 
depit-1 
-0.511** 
(0.215) 
-0.557*** 
(0.197) 
-0.628*** 
(0.196) 
2.492*** 
(0.956) 
-0.815* 
(0.420) 
-0.919*** 
(0.282) 
-0.971*** 
(0.286) 
0.626 
(2.127) 
logtfpit-1 
0.032* 
(0.018) 
0.348* 
(0.185) 
0.102** 
(0.050) 
 
0.008 
(0.023) 
0.644*** 
(0.242) 
0.172** 
(0.072) 
 
labour intensityit-1    
-0.044 
(0.255) 
   
0.668** 
(0.317) 
loglpit-1    
0.068*** 
(0.016) 
   
0.108*** 
(0.020) 
m2 (p-value)     0.445    
m3 (p-value) 0.257 0.346 0.346 0.260  0.097 0.101 0.199 
J (Hansen) 0.391 0.210 0.177 0.118 0.529 0.118 0.191 0.555 
IVs (lags) 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-2,… 
Δt-1… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
number of observations 12402 13425 13425 13645 5564 6349 6349 6470 
 
Notes:  see notes to table 1 and 2. 
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Figure 1: firm productivity and finance 
 
 
 
Notes: p
*
 is firms’ surviving productivity, and p
e
 is the minimum level of productivity when firms may start to 
raise external finance.  
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Table 1: summary statistics  
 
 
All 
firm-years 
private others 
diff. 
(p-value) 
Small & 
young 
others 
diff. 
(p-value) 
exporters 
non-
exporters 
diff. 
(p-value) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
leverage 
0.568 
(0.346) 
0.525 
(0.365) 
0.603 
(0.325) 
0. 000 
0.469 
(0.307) 
0.600 
(0.352) 
0. 000 
0.553 
(0.326) 
0.588 
(0.370) 
0. 000 
new equity 
0.070 
(0.240) 
0.089 
(0.276) 
0.054 
(0.205) 
0.000 
0.054 
(0.199) 
0.075 
(0.252) 
0.000 
0.075 
(0.241) 
0.062 
(0.239) 
0.003 
long-term debt 
0.054 
(0.094) 
0.041 
(0.083) 
0.064 
(0.101) 
0.000 
0.039 
(0.080) 
0.059 
(0.098) 
0.000 
0.049 
(0.086) 
0.060 
(0.103) 
0. 000 
long-term debt 
dummy 
0.586 
(0.493) 
0.498 
(0.500) 
0.657 
(0.475) 
0.000 
0.458 
(0.498) 
0.628 
(0.483) 
0.000 
0.593 
(0.491) 
0.575 
(0.494) 
0.039 
logtfp (LP) 
1.152 
(0.231) 
1.187 
(0.245) 
1.123 
(0.216) 
0.000 
1.107 
(0.232) 
1.167 
(0.229) 
0.000 
1.144 
(0.194) 
1.164 
(0.274) 
0. 000 
logtfp  
(Wooldridge GMM) 
2.963 
(0.109) 
2.956 
(0.245) 
2.968 
(0.112) 
0.000 
2.929 
(0.101) 
2.974 
(0.109) 
0.000 
2.973 
(0.102) 
2.949 
(0.117) 
0.000 
logtfp (ACF) 
2.190 
(0.092) 
2.191 
(0.105) 
2.189 
(0.094) 
0.125 
2.138 
(0.082) 
2.207 
(0.088) 
0.000 
2.197 
(0.080) 
2.181 
(0.105) 
0.000 
loglp 
8.683 
(1.006) 
8.691 
(0.960) 
8.676 
(1.042) 
0.403 
8.224 
(0.879) 
8.834 
(0.999) 
0.000 
8.734 
(0.894) 
8.612 
(1.136) 
0. 000 
logS 
16.297 
(1.402) 
16.014 
(1.274) 
16.528 
(1.459) 
0.000 
15.252 
(0.774) 
16.643 
(1.392) 
0.000 
16.503 
(1.266) 
16.019 
(1.524) 
0. 000 
asset growth 
0.112 
(0.377) 
0.153 
(0.409) 
0.079 
(0.345) 
0. 000 
0.117 
(0.391) 
0.111 
(0.372) 
0. 388 
0.139 
(0.354) 
0.077 
(0.403) 
0. 000 
tangibility 
0.276 
(0.160) 
0.243 
(0.139) 
0.303 
(0.171) 
0.000 
0.281 
(0.145) 
0.275 
(0.165) 
0.065 
0.273 
(0.147) 
0.281 
(0.177) 
0.003 
roa 
0.028 
(0.071) 
0.037 
(0.068) 
0.020 
(0.073) 
0. 000 
0.017 
(0.078) 
0.031 
(0.068) 
0. 000 
0.031 
(0.063) 
0.023 
(0.081) 
0. 000 
depreciation 
0.028 
(0.017) 
0.026 
(0.016) 
0.031 
(0.018) 
0.000 
0.026 
(0.015) 
0.029 
(0.018) 
0.000 
0.029 
(0.017) 
0.028 
(0.018) 
0. 000 
labour intensity 
0.106 
(0.072) 
0.109 
(0.073) 
0.103 
(0.071) 
0.000 
0.118 
(0.067) 
0.102 
(0.073) 
0.000 
0.108 
(0.066) 
0.103 
(0.079) 
0.001 
liquidity 
0.140 
(0.267) 
0.205 
(0.265) 
0.086 
(0.258) 
0.000 
0.186 
(0.286) 
0.124 
(0.259) 
0.000 
0.161 
(0.245) 
0.111 
(0.292) 
0.000 
coverage ratio 
0.147 
(0.311) 
0.205 
(0.362) 
0.100 
(0.253) 
0.000 
0.154 
(0.353) 
0.145 
(0.297) 
0.134 
0.153 
(0.291) 
0.139 
(0.337) 
0.018 
number of 
observations 
12618 
5672 
(45.0%) 
6946 
(55.0%) 
 
3132 
(24.8%) 
9486 
(75.2%) 
 
7246 
(57.4%) 
5372 
(42.6%) 
 
 
Notes: The table reports sample means. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 1 per cent tails of the 
distribution of each variable in the table have been winsorised. Leverage is firms’ total liability to total assets 
ratio; new equity, firms’ ratio of (changes in total shareholder’s equity - changes in retained earnings) / total 
assets; long-term debt, firms’ outstanding long-term debt to total assets ratio; long-term debt dummy equals 1 if 
firm i has positive long-term debt in year t, and 0 otherwise; logtfp, logarithm of firm’s total factor productivity; 
loglp, logarithm of real sales per employee; logS, logarithm of real sales; asset growth, the difference of 
logarithms of firms’ real net fixed assets from time t-1 to t; tangibility, total tangible assets / total assets; roa, 
firm’s return on assets = net profit / total assets; depreciation, depreciation / total assets; labour intensity = total 
wage bill / sales; liquidity, (current assets – current liabilities) / total assets; coverage ratio, net profit to current 
liabilities ratio. LP, Wooldridge GMM and ACF are the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), the Wooldridge (2009) 
and the Ackerberg, Cavesand Frazer (2015) methods of estimating TFP respectively. The currency unit is RMB 
yuan (the average exchange rate was approximately of USD: RMB = 1:6.3). See the Appendix for precise 
definitions of all variables. Diff. reports the p-values of the t test statistics for the equality of means. Private 
firms are defined according to firms’ ultimate controlling shareholders. A firm is defined as small and young if 
its real sales is ranked in the bottom 50 percentile of the real sales distribution of all firms in the same 2-digit 
industry and in the same year, and if its age is ranked in the bottom 50 percentile of the age distribution of all 
firms in the same 2-digit industry. Firm is defined an exporter if it has positive overseas sales in year t.  
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Table 2: The effect of productivity on total leverage  
 
dependent variable: 
leverageit 
All Private  
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
leveragei,t-1 
0.685*** 
(0.040) 
0.664*** 
(0.039) 
0.658*** 
(0.040) 
0.646*** 
(0.041) 
0.785*** 
(0.054) 
0.750*** 
(0.057) 
0.647*** 
(0.049) 
0.730*** 
(0.053) 
logSit-1 
0.015* 
(0.007) 
-0.051** 
(0.021) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.076** 
(0.032) 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.016) 
asset growthit-1 
-0.187*** 
(0.031) 
-0.206*** 
(0.030) 
-0.214*** 
(0.031) 
-0.196*** 
(0.030) 
-0.239*** 
(0.046) 
-0.262*** 
(0.045) 
-0.211*** 
(0.031) 
-0.217*** 
(0.045) 
tangibilityit-1 
0.493*** 
(0.116) 
0.622*** 
(0.124) 
0.591*** 
(0.136) 
0.524*** 
(0.116) 
0.574*** 
(0.200) 
0.699*** 
(0.201) 
0.702*** 
(0.193) 
0.629*** 
(0.186) 
roait-1 
-0.047 
(0.210) 
-0.281 
(0.176) 
-0.186 
(0.176) 
0.050 
(0.170) 
-0.241 
(0.320) 
-0.392 
(0.294) 
-0.251 
(0.219) 
0.041 
(0.274) 
depit-1 
-5.855*** 
(0.988) 
-5.540*** 
(1.005) 
-5.629*** 
(0.965) 
-5.841*** 
(0.991) 
-7.520*** 
(2.128) 
-7.861*** 
(2.219) 
-5.985*** 
(1.447) 
-7.548*** 
(1.981) 
logtfpit-1 
-0.021 
(0.072) 
1.734*** 
(0.627) 
0.340 
(0.228) 
 
0.069 
(0.083) 
2.156** 
(0.924) 
0.506* 
(0.275) 
 
labour intensityit-1    
0.488** 
(0.224) 
   
0.310 
(0.371) 
loglpit-1    
-0.009 
(0.015) 
   
0.000 
(0.027) 
m3 (p-value) 0.240 0.287 0.272 0.208 0.645 0.609 0.683 0.684 
J (Hansen) 0.144 0.140 0.163 0.185 0.509 0.534 0.983 0.191 
IVs (lags) 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
number of observations 12618 12623 12623 12624 5672 5674 5674 5676 
 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using system GMM estimators. i indexes firms; and t, time. All the 
regressions include year dummies, industry dummies which are at 2 digit level, and province dummies which 
indicate the location of firms’ headquarter. The whole sample regressions also include ownership dummies. The 
figures reported in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. m3 are tests for third-order serial correlations in 
the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. J tests 
show the validity of the instrument sets. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at 
the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. Also see Notes to Table 1. 
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Table 3: The effect of productivity on new equity  
 
dependent variable: 
new equityit 
All Private  
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
new equityi,t-1 
-0.086** 
(0.036) 
-0.023 
(0.069) 
-0.109*** 
(0.042) 
-0.050 
(0.040) 
-0.080* 
(0.046) 
-0.134*** 
(0.051) 
0.126 
(0.084) 
0.050 
(0.056) 
logSit-1 
-0.022*** 
(0.007) 
-0.116*** 
(0.030) 
-0.075*** 
(0.011) 
-0.042*** 
(0.008) 
-0.037*** 
(0.010) 
-0.154*** 
(0.041) 
-0.079*** 
(0.016) 
-0.043*** 
(0.014) 
asset growthit-1 
-0.042* 
(0.023) 
-0.069* 
(0.036) 
-0.012 
(0.027) 
-0.060** 
(0.024) 
-0.047* 
(0.025) 
-0.016 
(0.033) 
-0.151*** 
(0.046) 
-0.083** 
(0.033) 
tangibilityit-1 
0.068 
(0.098) 
0.375* 
(0.194) 
0.345*** 
(0.132) 
-0.049 
(0.109) 
0.184 
(0.172) 
-0.101 
(0.261) 
0.763*** 
(0.290) 
0.330 
(0.203) 
roait-1 
0.113 
(0.181) 
0.730*** 
(0.260) 
0.357* 
(0.190) 
0.163 
(0.172) 
0.170 
(0.199) 
0.188 
(0.239) 
0.807*** 
(0.315) 
0.347 
(0.271) 
depit-1 
1.412* 
(0.855) 
-0.370 
(1.719) 
1.448 
(0.933) 
2.387*** 
(0.908) 
1.405 
(1.580) 
3.742* 
(1.965) 
-2.938 
(2.358) 
-0.810 
(1.841) 
logtfpit-1 
0.143** 
(0.057) 
2.459*** 
(0.864) 
1.102*** 
(0.226) 
 
0.202*** 
(0.074) 
3.118*** 
(1.029) 
0.823*** 
(0.298) 
 
labour intensityit-1    
0.012 
(0.209) 
   
0.406 
(0.345) 
loglpit-1    
0.050*** 
(0.014) 
   
0.053*** 
(0.019) 
m2 (p-value) 0.611   0.430 0.401   0.511 
m3 (p-value)  0.690 0.849    0.781  
m4 (p-value)      0.917   
J (Hansen) 0.158 0.112 0.063 0.217 0.153 0.527 0.261 0.210 
IVs (lags) 
t-2,… 
Δt-1… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-2,… 
Δt-1… 
t-2,… 
Δt-1… 
t-4,… 
Δt-3… 
t-2,… 
Δt-1… 
t-2,… 
Δt-1… 
number of observations 12611 12616 12616 12617 5672 5674 5674 5676 
 
Notes: see notes to table 1 and 2.  
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 Table 4: The effect of productivity on long-term debt  
 
dependent variable: ltdit 
All Private  
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ltdi,t-1 
0.689*** 
(0.029) 
0.814*** 
(0.038) 
0.821*** 
(0.040) 
0.675*** 
(0.027) 
0.602*** 
(0.050) 
0.631*** 
(0.051) 
0.551*** 
(0.039) 
0.527*** 
(0.041) 
logSit-1 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-4.57e-3 
(0.002) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.016 
(0.011) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
asset growthit-1 
-0.013 
(0.008) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.016 
(0.013) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.028*** 
(0.010) 
-0.016 
(0.010) 
-0.021*** 
(0.006) 
-0.022*** 
(0.007) 
tangibilityit-1 
0.076** 
(0.030) 
0.017 
(0.057) 
0.031 
(0.056) 
0.071** 
(0.029) 
0.089** 
(0.038) 
0.041 
(0.050) 
0.100** 
(0.043) 
0.097*** 
(0.032) 
roait-1 
0.129** 
(0.056) 
0.205*** 
(0.077) 
0.200** 
(0.077) 
0.144** 
(0.051) 
0.050 
(0.061) 
0.024 
(0.069) 
0.044 
(0.045) 
0.087* 
(0.046) 
depit-1 
-0.511** 
(0.215) 
-0.033 
(0.405) 
-0.041 
(0.398) 
-0.454** 
(0.226) 
-1.391*** 
(0.391) 
-0.774** 
(0.403) 
-1.182*** 
(0.308) 
-1.285*** 
(0.292) 
logtfpit-1 
0.032* 
(0.018) 
-0.131 
(0.206) 
0.094 
(0.073) 
 
0.019 
(0.021) 
-0.244 
(0.219) 
0.122* 
(0.066) 
 
labour intensityit-1    
0.156*** 
(0.058) 
   
0.068 
(0.060) 
loglpit-1    
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
   
0.009** 
(0.04) 
m2 (p-value)     0.762 0.410 0.725 0.814 
m3 (p-value) 0.257 0.194 0.197 0.241     
J (Hansen) 0.391 0.327 0.265 0.251 0.475 0.538 0.157 0.739 
IVs (lags) 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-2,… 
Δt-1… 
t-2,… 
Δt-1… 
t-2,… 
Δt-1… 
t-2,… 
Δt-1… 
number of observations 12402 12407 12407 12408 5564 5566 5566 5568 
 
Notes: see notes to table 1 and 2.  
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Table 5: The effect of productivity on total leverage  
 
dependent variable: 
leverageit 
small & young / others exporters / non-exporters 
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
leveragei,t-1 
0.691*** 
(0.042) 
0.645*** 
(0.040) 
0.639*** 
(0.041) 
0.645*** 
(0.042) 
0.667*** 
(0.043) 
0.644*** 
(0.043) 
0.642*** 
(0.043) 
0.679*** 
(0.045) 
logSit-1 
0.017** 
(0.007) 
-0.039* 
(0.020) 
-0.000 
(0.009) 
0.026*** 
(0.008) 
0.022** 
(0.008) 
-0.046* 
(0.024) 
-0.001 
(0.033) 
0.034*** 
(0.010) 
asset growthit-1 
-0.192*** 
(0.031) 
-0.204*** 
(0.027) 
-0.206*** 
(0.029) 
-0.199*** 
(0.030) 
-0.194*** 
(0.032) 
-0.228*** 
(0.032) 
-0.232*** 
(0.033) 
-0.200*** 
(0.036) 
tangibilityit-1 
0.493** 
(0.120) 
0.622*** 
(0.116) 
0.580*** 
(0.127) 
0.542*** 
(0.111) 
0.500*** 
(0.119) 
0.636*** 
(0.126) 
0.599*** 
(0.140) 
0.448*** 
(0.119) 
roait-1 
-0.155*** 
(0.215) 
-0.299* 
(0.162) 
-0.237 
(0.166) 
-0.003 
(0.162) 
-0.086 
(0.233) 
-0.320* 
(0.191) 
-0.280 
(0.196) 
-0.110 
(0.198) 
depit-1 
-6.058*** 
(0.977) 
-5.715*** 
(0.965) 
-5.716*** 
(0.924) 
-6.072*** 
(0.928) 
-6.398*** 
(0.974) 
-6.298*** 
(0.997) 
-6.223*** 
(0.966) 
-5.962*** 
(1.019) 
logtfpit-1×type1 
-0.027 
(0.076) 
1.351** 
(0.606) 
0.209 
(0.214) 
 -0.013 
(0.081) 
1.770** 
(0.700) 
0.425* 
(0.242) 
 
logtfpit-1×(1-type1) 
-0.004 
(0.073) 
1.362** 
(0.604) 
0.228 
(0.212) 
 -0.027 
(0.076) 
1.759** 
(0.699) 
0.413* 
(0.239) 
 
labour intensityit-1    
0.358 
(0.221) 
   
-6.398*** 
(0.974) 
loglpit-1×type1    
-0.024 
(0.015) 
   
-0.013 
(0.081) 
loglpit-1×(1-type1)    
-0.020 
(0.015) 
   
-0.027 
(0.076) 
m3 (p-value) 0.234 0.281 0.263 0.209 0.249 0.303 0.278 0.249 
J (Hansen) 0.141 0.126 0.178 0.097 0.196 0.222 0.259 0.196 
IVs (lags) 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
χ
2 
(p-value) 0.186 0.091 0.033 0.039 0.473 0.164 0.263 0.473 
number of observations 12618 12623 12623 12624 12618 12623 12623 12618 
 
Notes: In column 1-4, type1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i belong to the group of small young firms, 
and 0 otherwise. In column 5-8, type1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i exports in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
χ
2
 tests the differentiated TFP effects under H0: logtfpit-1×type1= logtfpit-1×(1-type1). A significant χ
2
 indicates 
different TFP effects for the two corresponding groups of firms. Also see notes to table 1 and 2.  
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Table 6: The effect of productivity on new equity  
 
dependent variable: new 
equityit 
small & young / others exporters / non-exporters 
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
new equityi,t-1 
-0.081** 
(0.040) 
-0.131*** 
(0.040) 
-0.119*** 
(0.038) 
-0.065 
(0.040) 
-0.040 
(0.062) 
-0.093** 
(0.044) 
-0.092** 
(0.045) 
-0.022 
(0.052) 
logSit-1 
-0.027*** 
(0.007) 
-0.095*** 
(0.023) 
-0.071*** 
(0.010) 
-0.043*** 
(0.008) 
-0.016* 
(0.009) 
-0.109*** 
(0.027) 
-0.074*** 
(0.012) 
-0.038*** 
(0.010) 
asset growthit-1 
-0.004 
(0.024) 
-0.026 
(0.024) 
-0.013 
(0.024) 
-0.045* 
(0.023) 
-0.132*** 
(0.033) 
-0.080*** 
(0.030) 
-0.069** 
(0.030) 
-0.116*** 
(0.027) 
tangibilityit-1 
0.178* 
(0.100) 
0.144 
(0.119) 
0.318*** 
(0.121) 
0.028 
(0.112) 
-0.026 
(0.143) 
0.236* 
(0.142) 
0.374** 
(0.157) 
-0.036 
(0.149) 
roait-1 
0.052 
(0.179) 
0.419** 
(0.177) 
0.383** 
(0.179) 
0.130 
(0.166) 
0.069 
(0.267) 
0.349 
(0.220) 
0.266 
(0.227) 
0.168 
(0.242) 
depit-1 
0.854* 
(0.892) 
1.214 
(0.888) 
1.093 
(0.891) 
1.898** 
(0.934) 
1.190 
(1.384) 
-0.002 
(1.108) 
0.226 
(1.139) 
1.689 
(1.341) 
logtfpit-1×type1 
0.071 
(0.056) 
1.711** 
(0.660) 
0.884*** 
(0.213) 
 0.208** 
(0.084) 
2.260*** 
(0.763) 
1.077*** 
(0.245) 
 
logtfpit-1×(1-type1) 
0.138** 
(0.055) 
1.729*** 
(0.659) 
0.911*** 
(0.211) 
 0.144* 
(0.080) 
2.246*** 
(0.761) 
1.054*** 
(0.242) 
 
labour intensityit-1    
-0.009 
(0.198) 
   
0.439 
(0.247) 
loglpit-1×type1    
0.041*** 
(0.013) 
   
0.082*** 
(0.017) 
loglpit-1×(1-type1)    
0.048*** 
(0.014) 
   
0.075*** 
(0.017) 
m2 (p-value) 0.746   0.713 0.846   0.499 
m3 (p-value)  0.723 0.860   0.777 0.998  
J (Hansen) 0.159 0.118 0.172 0.235 0.185 0.079 0.102 0.125 
IVs(lags) 
t-2,… 
Δt-1… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-2,… 
Δt-1… 
t-2,… 
Δt-1… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-2,… 
Δt-1… 
χ
2
(p-value) 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.087 0.036 0.008 
number of observations 12611 12616 12616 12617 12611 12616 12616 12617 
 
Notes: See notes to table 1, 2 and 5.  
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Table 7: The effect of productivity on long-term debt  
 
dependent variable: ltdit 
small & young / others exporters / non-exporters 
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
LP Wooldridge  ACF  
Labour 
productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ltdi,t-1 
0.675*** 
(0.029) 
0.683*** 
(0.027) 
0.682*** 
(0.028) 
0.665*** 
(0.029) 
0.790*** 
(0.044) 
0.687*** 
(0.029) 
0.684*** 
(0.030) 
0.673*** 
(0.033) 
logSit-1 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
asset growthit-1 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.012* 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.018 
(0.014) 
-0.015* 
(0.008) 
-0.013 
(0.008) 
-0.017* 
(0.010) 
tangibilityit-1 
0.076** 
(0.029) 
0.062** 
(0.031) 
0.076** 
(0.033) 
0.057* 
(0.031) 
-0.014 
(0.059) 
0.049 
(0.037) 
0.063 
(0.041) 
0.065* 
(0.034) 
roait-1 
0.157*** 
(0.053) 
0.171*** 
(0.048) 
0.166*** 
(0.048) 
0.165*** 
(0.054) 
0.258*** 
(0.097) 
0.155*** 
(0.056) 
0.139** 
(0.055) 
0.146** 
(0.066) 
depit-1 
-0.561*** 
(0.211) 
-0.477** 
(0.213) 
-0.529** 
(0.203) 
-0.455* 
(0.242) 
0.050 
(0.463) 
-0.427* 
(0.232) 
-0.494** 
(0.225) 
-0.577** 
(0.268) 
logtfpit-1×type1 
0.021 
(0.018) 
-0.003 
(0.163) 
0.032 
(0.056) 
 -0.008 
(0.029) 
0.066 
(0.181) 
0.040 
(0.064) 
 
logtfpit-1×(1-type1) 
0.027 
(0.018) 
-0.001 
(0.163) 
0.036 
(0.055) 
 0.001 
(0.026) 
0.068 
(0.181) 
0.042 
(0.064) 
 
labour intensityit-1    
0.111* 
(0.063) 
   
0.168** 
(0.069) 
loglpit-1×type1    
0.008* 
(0.004) 
   
1.075e-1** 
(4.91e-2) 
loglpit-1×(1-type1)    
0.009** 
(0.004) 
   
1.155e-1** 
(4.83e-2) 
m3 (p-value) 0.275 0.278 0.286 0.252 0.173 0.240 0.253 0.221 
J (Hansen) 0.356 0.301 0.163 0.366 0.873 0.445 0.310 0.412 
IVs(lags) 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
t-3,… 
Δt-2… 
χ
2
(p-value) 0.154 0.145 0.085 0.029 0.327 0.537 0.451 0.315 
number of observations 12402 12407 12407 12408 12402 12407 12407 12408 
 
Notes: See notes to table 1, 2 and 5.  
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Table 8: The effects of exogenous policy shock on external finance  
 
dependent variable: leverageit new equityit ltdit 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Treati (β) 
0.041*** 
(0.011) 
-0.024** 
(0.011) 
0.027*** 
(0.003) 
Postpolicyt (γ) 
-0.071*** 
(0.006) 
-0.046*** 
(0.008) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Treati × Postpolicyt (θ) 
0.009 
(0.015) 
-0.019 
(0.014) 
-0.017*** 
(0.004) 
R
2 
0.050 0.036 0.062 
number of observations 14949 14944 14739 
  
Notes: The table reports the OLS results of the difference-in-difference estimation in eq. (3). The standard errors 
of estimated coefficients are reported in the parentheses. Treatt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i is in one 
of the following manufacturing industries: cement and asbestine cement products; coking; metal products; paper 
making and paper products; production of leather, fur, down and related products; smelting and pressing of 
ferrous metals; smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metals; and textile, and 0 otherwise. Postpolicyt is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is in year 2012 to 2016, and 0 otherwise. Ownership dummies and 
province dummies are included in all the regressions.  
 
Table 9: The effects of exogenous policy shock on external finance  
 
dependent variable: leverageit new equityit ltdit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A       
 small & young  others small & young  others small & young  others 
Treati (β) 
0.075*** 
(0.022) 
0.020* 
(0.012) 
-0.059* 
(0.030) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.029*** 
(0.004) 
Postpolicyt (γ) 
-0.149*** 
(0.011) 
-0.087*** 
(0.007) 
-0.197*** 
(0.027) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.020*** 
(0.003) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
Treati × Postpolicyt (θ) 
-0.018 
(0.033) 
0.017 
(0.016) 
-0.039 
(0.049) 
-0.037*** 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.021*** 
(0.005) 
R
2 
0.127 0.047 0.085 0.022 0.121 0.063 
number of observations 2918 12031 2918 12026 2897 11842 
Panel B       
 exporter non-exporter exporter non-exporter exporter non-exporter 
Treati (β) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
0.077*** 
(0.018) 
-0.039** 
(0.016) 
-0.017 
(0.015) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.035*** 
(0.005) 
Postpolicyt (γ) 
-0.075*** 
(0.008) 
-0.068*** 
(0.010) 
-0.077*** 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.011) 
-0.014*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Treati × Postpolicyt (θ) 
0.017 
(0.017) 
0.034 
(0.028) 
-0.010 
(0.099) 
-0.014 
(0.025) 
-0.013*** 
(0.005) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
R
2 
0.072 0.044 0.040 0.039 0.078 0.064 
number of observations 8714 6235 8710 6234 8568 6174 
 
Notes: see notes to table 8.  
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Highlights: 
 We explore Chinese firms financing behaviour. 
 Productivity determines the Chinese firms’ external finance. 
 The productive Chinese firms may raise new equity finance. 
 Large old firms and exporting firms make better use of their productivity to gain 
external finance 
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